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Governance, rights and the demand for democracy: evidence 
from Bangladesh 
 
Joe Devine, Ipshita Basu and Graham Brown  
INTRODCTION 
 
Over the last twenty years, interest in good governance has progressively become  
more intense and focused.  In part this reflects a conviction shared by academics, policy 
makers and practitioners that good governance can positively influence a range of key 
issues including poverty reduction, economic growth, the efficiency of service provision, 
the impact and effectiveness of development programmes, and the building of more 
inclusive societies (Kaufmann et al 1999, 2002; McGillivray et al 2005). Conversely,  
poor quality governance is considered a barrier or hindrance to growth and wellbeing, 
and an incubator for corruption, violation of rights, discrimination, violence and 
disorder.  At least this is how the theory goes. However – and not for the first time in its 
history -  the experience of Bangladesh appears as something of a paradox when looked 
at from a less normative perspective. Of late therefore it has become almost a truism to 
note and then question the co-existence of two informed observations about modern 
Bangladesh. On the one hand, the country has made significant and consistent progress 
in socio-economic terms.  It has thus enjoyed steady and prolonged macro economic 
growth rates, fuelled by manufacture and remittance growth; made significant progress 
in relation to many of the MDG targets; and reduced the proportion of the population in 
poverty from 40% in 2005 to 31.5% in 2010 (World Bank 2013, BBS 2010).  On the 
other hand, Bangladesh’s performance in governance terms has been poor, epitomised 
in its classification by Transparency International for five successive years (2001 – 
2005) as the world’s most corrupt country. The co-existence of poor governance with 
successful growth and poverty reduction raises many questions and puts some core 
development assumptions to the test. Where some might see paradox in all of this, 
others may see collision.  At a minimum, the post 1990 history of Bangladesh tells us 
that the two observations are not mutually exclusive.  
Governance discussions in Bangladesh, as elsewhere in the world, were originally 
steeped in a commitment to an alliance, uncontested since the end of the Cold War, of 
liberal democracy and market-based economic growth. This global commitment 
dovetailed nicely with political developments in Bangladesh, in particular the 
reintroduction of formal electoral democracy in 1990. The onset of electoral democracy 
witnessed a radical shift in the country’s political landscape with both the military and 
the bureaucracy visibly withdrawing from front line politics to allow for the emergence 
of a new political class (Blair 2010). With the exception of the 2007-2008 hiatus when 
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the military remerged as the de facto backers of the caretaker government, electoral 
politics has helped institutionalise a form of democratic governance in Bangladesh 
which has remained intact and relatively stable albeit, as the contributions to this 
volume attest, deeply problematic.  Since the introduction of formal democratic politics, 
Bangladesh has gone on to almost effortlessly pass Huntington’s famous two turnover 
test (Huntington 1990). At the same time however, electoral politics has evolved into a 
de facto two party system in which both parties ‘compete’ for the right to monopolise 
the political system and dominate both public and private institutions. The competition 
is zero-sum orientated, and profoundly impacts the nature and dynamics of party-state 
relations as well as state-society relations.  The result of this democratic process is an 
aggressive and unforgiving polarised political landscape, in which the interests of the 
state and those of the party in power, are almost completely aligned.   
Commitment to democracy is not just concerned with formal political processes and 
actors but also citizenship identity and practices. Bangladesh remains a relatively young 
country and democracy was one of the four founding principles of its first Constitution. 
Many citizens therefore have firsthand experience of the struggle for independence and 
democracy, and this memory is kept alive in the imagination of younger generations. 
However while there seems to be strong public support for democracy (Duncan and 
Williams 2012), we know far less about the ability of citizens to meaningfully contest 
and hold the state to account. Some have argued that the room for manoeuvre to 
promote and protect citizenship rights in Bangladesh is highly restricted, and Wood’s 
(2000) analogy of Bangladesh society as a prison encapsulates this perspective nicely. 
Others however have argued that social relations are more fluid and have pointed to 
evidence of stronger citizenship identity and practices in cases where these relations 
are supported in the right way (Kabeer 2011). Even in this relatively more optimistic 
scenario however,  Kabeer admits that attempts to change existing power structures are 
“constantly undermined by various forms of unruly practices on the part of the more 
powerful sections of society” (ibid:352). In any case, it appears that the re-introduction 
of formal democracy has not automatically resulted in a wider establishment of 
substantive citizenship rights. A significant part of the explanation for this takes us back 
to the power of the political parties. In other words, the nature and dynamics of 
citizenship is fundamentally shaped by the political hegemony resulting from the 
competition between the two parties vying for power. If therefore we consider 
citizenship based or formal electoral practices, we arrive at a similar conclusion:  that 
the form of democracy which has evolved in Bangladesh has become a core part of the 
‘governance problem’ rather than a solution.  
This context leads us directly to the key question which underpins this chapter. 
Through an analysis of new empirical data, we want to explore the extent and nature of 
public support and commitment to democracy in Bangladesh.  There are a number of 
converging reasons why this question is hugely significant.  First, we have relatively 
little information on public perceptions, expectations and demands for democracy in 
Bangladesh. The 2008 State of Governance Report, published by the Institute of 
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Governance Studies, is one of the very few attempts to look at public attitudes about 
political legitimacy and performance in Bangladesh (IGS 2008). Second, governance 
analysis and reforms have tended to focus almost exclusively on the supply measures of 
governance (for example, strengthening state institutions, capabilities and 
accountability) and given scant attention to demand measures  (Wood and Landell Mills 
2010). In part, as we have argued in our previous point, this is because we know so little 
about the demands for democracy, and know even less about how then to support 
these. The danger however with an exclusive focus on supply side measures, as Wood 
and Landell Mills rightly argue, is that it assumes that political elites are willing to 
engage with progressive change. This is clearly not a robust assumption in the case of 
Bangladesh. By looking at the demand side of governance, we therefore hope to better 
balance our understanding of governance dynamics.  Third, by examining attitudes 
about political life and practices, we are able to look also at the extent to which 
particular governance arrangements are valued and likely to elicit public support and 
commitment. This is important because the so called ‘democratic project’ can translate 
into a myriad of institutional forms and arrangements, and different political 
settlements. Gauging the aspirations and preferences of citizens is a first and important 
step to understand which settlements are likely to gain more or less support; and by 
implication, acquire greater or weaker legitimacy in Bangladesh. 
Recently, our understanding of public opinions towards democracy has taken strides 
forward with the emergence of different ‘democracy barometers’. Work  on the 
barometers aspires to rebalance political analysis by combining concerns about ‘what 
people think and aspire to’ with the more traditional research focus on the actions and 
behaviour of political elites and organisations. The barometers have also opened up a 
number of new substantive areas of research including trying to understand what 
values or aspirations shape people’s support for democratic regimes. Bratton and 
Mattes 2001 (see also Mattes and Bratton 2007) for example analysed data from the 
Afrobaramoter to examine the extent to which citizen demand for democracy was a 
principled affair (i.e. reflecting intrinsic support) or relied on the performance of 
governments (i.e. reflecting instrumental support). Their analysis led to two 
conclusions. First that citizens support for democracy did not depend on a regime’s 
economic performance, suggesting that democracy was valued for what it is (i.e. as an 
end in its own right) rather than what it can do (i.e. as a means). Second, this intrinsic 
commitment to democracy however did not mean that governments could do what they 
wanted or act in a wholly unaccountable manner. Regime performance therefore 
remained important in terms of citizen support and legitimacy building. However and 
perhaps counter intuitively, it was the ability of governments to provide ‘political goods’ 
such as the rule of law and the protection of freedom as opposed to economic ones 
which influenced citizens’ assessment of performance. In another article, Bratton and 
colleagues take this idea further by testing it against a Globalbaramoter which includes 
the Latino barometer, the Afrobarometer, the Asian barometers and the Arab barometer 
(Chu et al 2008). Not surprisingly, they found that people across the globe support 
4 
 
democracy for quite different reasons. However across three of the regions, they found 
that popular approval for democracy depended more on the delivery of political goods 
than it did on economic ones. Latin America was the exception where national economic 
conditions were prioritised more than political considerations,  but only marginally so. 
This kind of analysis is relevant to the context of Bangladesh and is central to the 
argument of this chapter. While there is evidence of general public support for 
democracy in Bangladesh (IGS 2008, de Souza et al 2008), we do not know if that 
support has any depth, or if that support could be equally extended to different types of 
democratic governance arrangements. Reflecting on the distinction between 
instrumental and intrinsic support for democracy therefore gives us an analytical lens 
to examine the nature of the political process in Bangladesh. Furthermore, while it is 
safe to assume that the survival of all democratic regimes depends to some extent on 
government performance, the priority given to ‘political goods’ as highlighted by the 
work of Bratton and colleagues, is significant. These political goods typically include the 
rule of law, the curtailing of corruption, the protection of rights and freedom, the ability 
of citizens to change government by lawful means and so forth – a list which mirrors 
many of the priorities included in good governance programmes. While successive 
Bangladesh governments have managed to deliver relatively strong economic goods, it 
is precisely their performance in delivering political goods which has cast a long and 
murky shadow over the current governance landscape.  
 
GOVERNANCE IN BANGLADESH: BETWEEN FRUSTRATION AND HOPE  
Since the reintroduction of electoral democracy in 1991, Bangladesh’s democratic 
journey has faced a number of challenges. Two of these challenges are particularly 
relevant to our discussion. The first challenge, alluded to in our introduction, relates to 
the dominance of the country’s two main political parties: the Awami League and the 
Bangladesh Nationalist Party; and in particular to the confrontational relations between 
them. The democratic experience in Bangladesh is one in which the party in power 
adopts a winner-takes-all approach and monopolises the state apparatus, while the 
losing party normally ends up boycotting parliament and pursuing a strategy of protest 
and disruption outside of parliament through hartals and street violence. The second 
challenge is the rising prominence of the religious right in mainstream politics and the 
place of political Islam in relation to Bangladesh’s commitments to secularism and 
religious pluralism. Below we look at each of these in more detail. .  
Although many parties contest national elections in Bangladesh, only four (Awami 
League, Bangladesh Nationalist Party, Jatiyo Party and the Jamaat Islami party) are 
serious contenders for parliamentary seats; and only two (Awami League and the 
Bangladesh Nationalist Party) ever win the elections. Since the reintroduction of 
democracy in 1991 therefore, the two leading parties have moved from a position of 
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prominence to one of dominance, creating effectively a two party system. This party 
system is remarkably stable and robust and yet at the same time, is built on relations 
which are vitriolic, violent and devoid of trust. Commentators have explained the 
endemic violence and lack of accountability in Bangladesh’s democratic system as the 
result of a ‘politics of vengeance’ (Riaz, 2004) and the ‘politics of distrust’ (Quadir, 
2010), where intense political rivalry and the opposition’s party’s de facto non-
acceptance of the legitimacy of the party in power poses a constant threat to the 
democratic system itself.  
Political competition between the two parties is organised through patron-client 
relations that stretch across public institutions and the private sector and are also 
deeply embedded in Bangladeshi society reaching right down to urban slums and rural 
areas (see Kochanek 1993, Khan, 2005.  Patronage is mobilised both vertically - through 
a chain of neta-karmi  (leader-worker) relations based on kinship, localised and 
personalised ties; and horizontally -where the party in power uses the state machinery 
to distribute resources to maintain support groups in every sphere of public life (Islam, 
2002, Osman, 2010). 
In governance terms, this results in the conflation of the interests of the state with the 
party that comes into power. Public institutions such as the civil service and the 
judiciary exhibit high degrees of politicisation with recruitment and promotions being 
determined on partisan terms (see SOG 2006, SOG 2008). Bangladesh is also one of the 
most centralised countries in the world (World Bank 2010) which means that the ruling 
party has a firm control over the operations of local government institutions, the 
dynamics of local politics, and the disbursement of sizeable development funds.  In line 
with a winner-takes-all form of politics, major development projects tend to go to areas 
controlled by the ruling party while constituencies loyal to opposition parties are often 
excluded or at best under-resourced.  
Consequently, the party in opposition plays less of a constructive role in the democratic 
system and concerns itself mainly with contesting the legitimacy of the party in power 
and toppling its government (Quadir, 2010).  The culture of parliamentary boycotts 
illustrates this point well (Rahaman, 2007). For example, the AL boycotted 156 out of 
382 days of parliament working days during the BNP’s government of 1996-2001, 
whereas the BNP and its allies boycotted 222 of the 373 parliament working days over 
the tenure of the AL government of 2001-2006 (Rahaman, 2007, p. 110). Over time, the 
politics of boycotting has been ramped up. At the moment, the ‘main opposition party’ 
(BNP) has no seats in Parliament having decided to completely boycott the 2014 
elections, after having set a record for the number of boycotted days in the previous 
Parliament. The immediate result of boycotting is that political opposition is removed 
from Parliament and played out mostly in the streets through the medium of party-led 
hartals (strikes). Historically  hartals played a crucial role in mobilising dissent and 
protest against colonial powers in Bangladesh and other parts of South Asia. Today 
however they are more associated with intimidation, violence and coercion; and inflict 
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huge costs – financial and otherwise – on the nation as a whole.  In 2003, the UNDP 
undertook a nationwide opinion survey to assess public perceptions on the use of 
hartals. While 73% of the 3,058 respondents believed that hartals were legitimate 
modes of protest as citizens have the right to dissent, 95% believed they had a negative 
impact on the economy, 92% claimed that they were not effective in pressurising the 
government to institute change, 51% identified parliamentary debate as an alternative 
to hartals, and 50% believed politicians gained financially from hartals (UNDP, 2005).  
Political violence routinely comes to a head in the run up to national elections, and it 
was in the face of this challenge that the 13th Constitutional Amendment in 1996 
introduced the provision for a neutral caretaker government to oversee national 
elections in a fair and impartial manner, and the subsequent introduction of a new 
government. The system, often heralded as a unique feature of Bangladesh’s democracy, 
was in place for the parliamentary elections of 1996, 2001 and 2008.  In the run up to 
the ninth parliamentary election, fixed for 22 January  2007, the leading political parties 
refused to agree on a candidate to lead the caretaker government. This opened up space 
for the military to move in and allow the President to become the de facto leader of the 
caretaker government. Quickly, opposition parties objected and this led to increased 
violence and protest on the streets. In response, the President imposed a state of 
emergency on the 11 January 2007. The very next day a military backed caretaker 
government, with donor support, was appointed to run the country. This government 
remained in power for two years and set out to clean up politics and deal with 
corruption in order to create a level playing field for the next national election. These 
two years put Bangladesh’s democratic commitments to the test (see Ahmed, 2011).  
Although initially there was some citizen support for the new caretaker government, 
over time this faded as a result of what appeared to be an authoritarian approach which 
included arrests without charge and the heavy-handed influence of the army. This led to 
a popular demand for the restoration of democracy through national elections (Alamgir, 
2009). The Awami league government which came into power after a landslide victory 
in 2008 introduced a 15th amendment in June 2011, which abolished the system of 
caretaker government along with strict provisions against future military take-over of 
state power, stating that such acts would be treated as treachery and subversion. 
Paradoxically it was Awami League who led the campaign to have the caretaker 
government introduced and in line with the pendulum politics of Bangladesh, it is the 
Bangladesh Nationalist Party which has been leading the call for its reintroduction over 
the past few years! 
One of the general theses about Bangladesh – and which this chapter will directly 
engage with – is that although the quality of democracy may be wanting, people are 
steadfast in their commitment to democracy. This argument is often used, especially in 
the context of the events following 9/11 and the global discourse on the ‘war on terror’, 
to showcase Bangladesh as a Muslim majority country with a high regard for political 
freedom and secularism. Like democracy, secularism is one of the founding pillars of 
Bangladesh first constitution. However even the first government of Sheikh Mujibur 
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Rahman quickly began to court Islamic political opponents who had been defeated by 
his political agenda based on ‘Secular Bengali Nationalism’.  Shifts in ideological 
associations, religious or otherwise, have come to characterise successive political 
leaders in Bangladesh. This ideological oscillation has allowed for the emergence and 
growth of religious parties, most notably the Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh; and the 
establishment of Islam as the state religion in 1998. While these changes are often 
credited to the military regimes of Ziaur Rahman (1975-81) and Hussein Mohammad 
Ershad (1982-90) who allegedly courted JIB in order to earn legitimacy for military rule 
and win the approval of oil-rich Middle Eastern Islamic countries who were a major 
source of foreign aid (Hasan, 2011), political leaders in the post 1990 democratic 
regime have also been busy to make tactical use of religious ideologies in order to 
mobilise support and outflank their competitors. On 1 August 2013, the high court 
declared that the registration of the country’s most prolific Islamic party (Jamaat-e-
Islami ) was illegal and as a consequence banned it from participating in the next 
parliamentary elections. This news was greeted by some as a victory of Awami League 
over Jamaat-e-Islami , of secularism over religious based parties. However following the 
ruling, the Awami League publically distanced itself from any move to ban Jamaat-e-
Islami, partly for fear of a potential backlash accusing them of being against religion. 
Religious parties in Bangladesh have always been electoral fringe players (Khondker, 
2010) but religion continues to influence government decisions, its social policy 
strategies (Asadullah and Chaudhury 2006), and make itself more visible in social and 
public life (Devine and White 2012). Both religious and secular ideologies therefore are 
important for the main political parties, and leaders are content to tactically associate 
with both ideologies and distance themselves from any ‘bad press’ associated with 
either.  
More recently the question of militant Islam has also risen to prominence with 
Bangladesh being seen by some as a home to more radical and fundamentalist elements 
(Seabrook 2002, Riaz 2004, Uddin 2006). There is no doubt that in Bangladesh, Islamic 
militancy is indeed a ‘complex web’ (Riaz 2008), capable of the kind of mobilisation that 
was implemented in 2005 to carry out the synchronised explosion of 500 bombs in 63 
of the country’s 64 districts. It is however far less clear whether the existence of these 
groups constitutes a meaningful step towards religious nationalism as such; whether 
these groups have any real influence amongst the political elite; and whether they have 
significant citizen support. These remain important and in some respects, open 
questions. The 15th amendment retained Islam as the state religion but also restored 
secularism and the freedom of religion in the Constitution. Political Islam in Bangladesh 
therefore seems to represent an ideological resource that taps into notions about 
Bangladeshi identity and which can be drawn upon tactically by the political elite rather 
than a measured approach to institute Islamic law or a public acceptance for religious 
fundamentalism in mainstream politics. 
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METHODS 
The chapter draws on original data derived from a 2010 national household survey 
commissioned by the The Daily Star, the largest circulating English daily newspaper in 
Bangladesh; and Nielson Bangladesh, a specialised information and measurement 
company. The 2010 survey followed up a Governance Barometer survey carried out by 
the Institute of Governance Studies in 2009 (IGS 2008) and adopted a similar 
methodological approach. The overall aim of both surveys was to explore public 
perceptions on political life in Bangladesh. A total of 2,520 respondents took part in the 
2010 survey from 44 districts covering all 7 administrative divisions of Bangladesh.  
Thirty percent of respondents were urban residents and seventy percent were rural. All 
respondents were adults (i.e. over 18 years of age), and the sample had an equal 
number of men and women.  
The survey asked a range of questions about attitudes towards democracy and 
governance more generally, mostly in the form of statements with which respondents 
could express agreement or disagreement, in some cases on a typical Likert scale (from 
‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree’), in other cases a binary yes/no option.  Our 
methodological approach was as follows.  First we examined descriptive statistics and 
cross-tabulations to identify different categories of respondents.  As we discuss in the 
next section, cross-tabulating questions relating to the position of Islam with respect to 
democracy produces some naively counterintuitive results, and we use these results as 
the basis of our categorisation.   
Using these categories, we proceed to examine the socio-economic determinants of 
support for democracy.  In particular, as articulated above, we are interested in different 
justifications for democracy and how far these can be explained.  We exploit a range of 
questions that elicit responses to a range of ethical and practical questions about 
democracy to construct indices using factor analysis.  Factor analysis is based on the 
presumption that responses to such categorical questions are reflective of an 
underlying ‘latent’ continuous variable and uses the cross-correlation between different 
answers to these categorical questions to construct a factor loading to estimate the 
latent variable for each individual.  We discuss the specific construction of the indices 
we use below. 
Regression analysis was performed using the Stata software with robust standard 
errors calculated using the survey sample frame. 
 
SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY: AMBIGUOUS DEMOCRATS AND AMBIGUOUS 
THEOCRACTS  
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The starting point for our analysis is to assess the level of support citizens have for 
democracy in Bangladesh. We have evidence from previous research that levels of 
support have been traditionally high. Thus the 2001 World Values Survey  found that  as 
many as 98 percent of respondent in Bangladesh approved of the democratic system, 
and this overwhelming endorsement was also evident in more recent carried out under 
the State of Democracy in South Asia project (de Souza et al 2008). It is important 
however to revisit the core question about support for democracy because since the two 
referenced surveys, Bangladesh’s experience of democracy has had to face two years of 
military backed caretaker government (2007-2009) which was interpreted by some as 
a reversal of the democratic project (Diamond 2011). Furthermore following the 2007-
2009 period, there have been continuous media reports and commentaries suggesting 
the association of the democratic machinery – political parties in particular – with 
patronage, violence and intimidation has increased.  
The survey asked general questions about support for democracy in three different 
ways: 
 How suitable is democracy for Bangladesh (on a five-point scale from ‘not at all 
suitable’ to ‘very suitable’)?; 
 What is the best form of government for Bangladesh (democracy, Islamic state, 
military government, or other)?; and, 
 Do you agree that democracy is preferable to any other kind of government 
(yes/no)? 
In each case, support for democracy was overwhelming: 87 per cent agreed that 
democracy is preferable to any other kind of government,  83 per cent that democracy 
was the best form of government for Bangladesh, and 75 per cent that democracy was 
‘suitable’ or ‘very suitable’ for Bangladesh.  Despite therefore the apparent reversals or 
setbacks to the democratic project, levels of support for democracy remain remarkably 
high in Bangladesh. This is not a trivial finding given the recent state of politics in 
Bangladesh. Indeed one might be tempted to ask the question: why in the face of so 
many political setbacks, has the level of support for democracy remained so high in 
Bangladesh? The most obvious response to this is that Bangladesh citizens prefer 
democracy to other alternatives. We will examine this below. Here however it is 
important to acknowledge an equally plausible explanation which is rarely highlighted 
in the literature, namely that democracy in Bangladesh has become an established part 
of the polity and actually possesses quite resilient roots. This interpretation would  
certainly be consistent with a number of observations about Bangladesh including high 
levels of political participation and a strong tradition of citizen activism expressed 
through various civil society initiatives as well as through forms of unruly politics (see 
Hossain this volume).  
Having established high levels of support for democracy, we need to explore further the 
aggregate statistics because they could camouflage the kinds of ambiguity we seek to 
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explain in this chapter.  Thus for example, while the data clearly shows that people 
preferred democracy to any other kind of government and also felt that it was suitable 
for Bangladesh, there is an important difference in response rates. In fact, of the 87 per 
cent who stated that democracy was preferable, only 20 per cent also thought it was 
suited for Bangladesh. Rather than view these results as evidence of inconsistent or 
unreliable responses, we see this as evidence of the kinds of ambiguous or pluralist 
attitudes towards democracy we want to explore in this chapter.   
A similar initially counterintuitive finding emerges when we compare attitudes towards 
democracy and attitudes towards a secular/Islamic state. Bangladesh is the third largest 
Muslim country in the world and as argued above, Islam is a prominent if not hyper-
visible but contested feature of the current  political landscape. One of the curious 
observations about the rise of ‘political Islam’ in Bangladesh is that it seems to have 
occurred without resulting in  a concomitant erosion of the secular character of the 
polity. Hence the present government has gone out of its way to present the country as a 
secular democracy, and yet it retained Islam as the state religion in the recent 
constitutional amendment.  At the same time as it proclaims its Islamic credentials, it 
has supported, if not engineered, some high-visible attacks on the most prominent of 
Islamic parties. The relationships therefore between secularism, Islam and democratic 
commitments in Bangladesh are complex, reflecting a fundamental and as yet 
unresolved tension around national identity. The question therefore of whether 
Bangladesh is a country of secular Bengalis or Muslim Bangladeshis may be old (Uddin 
2006) but it continues to agitate and divide the country today.   
Simple cross-tabulations from the survey illustrate this point.  Respondents were asked 
two questions that related directly to Bangladesh’s potential status as an Islamic state.  
The first asked simply how far respondents agreed with the statement that Bangladesh 
should be an Islamic State; the second asked respondents which form of government 
was most suitable for Bangladesh, with an Islamic State listed as one of five options 
which also included democracy and military rule.  The point here is that the second 
question has ‘exclusive responses’ in that it forces respondents to select between an 
‘Islamic State’ and ‘democracy’. The first question instead is non-exclusive. Table 1 
crosstabulates the proportion of respondents who agreed (or ‘strongly agreed’) that 
Bangladesh should be an Islamic State (i.e. the non-exclusive question) with the 
proportion who thought that an Islamic State was the most suitable form of government 
for Bangladesh (the exclusive option). For both questions, we have excluded non-
Muslim responses. When presented with the non-exclusionary question therefore, just 
over three-quarters of Muslim respondents agreed that Bangladesh should be an 
Islamic state (of these, over 50% ‘strongly agreed’). However when asked to select 
between an Islamic State, democracy and other institutional options, almost 9 in 10 
respondents selected against an Islamic State and the overwhelming majority selected 
‘democracy’ instead.  This leads to a number of important reflections.  First, it is clear 
that respondents do not typically see a contradiction between an Islamic State and 
democracy (but neither do they see them as co-terminous). In part, this reflects the fact 
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that citizens in Bangladesh are quite accustomed to the intermingling of religion and 
politics: the formal commitment to democracy has gone hand in hand with the 
identification of Islam as the state religion; some religious leaders have gone on to forge 
relatively successful careers in electoral politics; many religious parties have worked 
within the parameters of electoral democracy as opposed to calling for its rejection. For 
the many therefore, the rise of ‘political Islam’ does not pose the kind of direct threat to 
democracy  that is often associated with other Islamicists’ movements (Nasr 2005).  
The analysis of Table 1 allows for a different interpretation which has also been 
suggested in work by de Souza et al (2008). Their research looked at the experience of 
democracy across South Asia (Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka). Forty 
percent of their respondents agreed that religious leaders rather than politicians should 
make the important decisions in the country. Response patterns across countries of 
course varied, with the majority support in Bangladesh and Pakistan. Rather than see 
this as an indication of citizens’ desire for a religious as opposed to democratic regime, 
the authors suggest that support for religion may be “an expression of unease with the 
received model of democracy and a desire to combine the existing model with other 
virtues” (de Souza et al 2008:95). This is not only consistent with the analysis presented 
in Table 1, but resonates very strongly with perceptions that politics in Bangladesh is 
dysfunctional and dominated by money, corruption, goons and people with little 
background and training in formal politics (Khan 2003). 
Table 1: Perspectives on Islamic State 
% of total Muslim respondents “Islamic state is the best form of 
government for Bangladesh” 
Disagree Agree Total 
“Bangladesh 
should be an 
Islamic state” 
Disagree 23.1 0.5 23.6 
Agree 65.1 11.4 76.4 
Total 88.1 11.9 100.0 
 
Nonetheless, we have now two areas of political ambiguity: ambiguity over how 
preferable democracy is per se; and, among Muslim respondents, ambiguity over its 
relationship to this issue of an Islamic State.  By describing attitudes as ambiguous, we 
are not making normative judgments. The global ideal of democracy can be translated 
into many forms and our analysis so far suggests that the democratic process in 
Bangladesh, in both fragile and consolidated moments, offers new expressions of 
democracy permeated with distinctive and interesting meanings.  
Before examining why people might hold ambiguous views, it is worth examining who 
holds such views.  In order to do so, we define two new analytical categories.  We define 
‘ambiguous democrats’ as those who expressed a preference for democracy over all 
other forms of government, but who also did not see it as suitable for Bangladesh. This 
group accounts for 20.4 per cent of responses.  We define ‘ambiguous theocrats’ as 
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those Muslims who thought that Bangladesh should be an Islamic state but who also 
expressed a preference for democracy over all other forms of government, including an 
Islamic state. This group accounts for 7.8 per cent of Muslim responses (of whom 
around 70 per cent were also ‘ambiguous democrats’). 
We run simple probit regressions on these new variables with a range of standard social 
and demographic predictor variables:  age, gender, level of education, income, and 
urban residence.  For ambiguous democrats, we also include religion.  The results are 
presented in Table 2 and show clear and divergent trends.  Basic demographic 
characteristics—age and gender—are not significant in explaining ambiguous attitudes, 
neither is education below the tertiary level.  However ambiguous democrats are 
significantly more likely to have tertiary education, tend to live in urban areas, and tend 
to have higher incomes. What is striking about this finding is that other studies 
(deSouza et al 2008, Shastrri and Palshikar 2010) have found that people with these 
same characteristics (i.e. higher levels of education, urban residence and higher 
incomes) are far more likely to support democracy that those without.  So what might 
drive support for democracy, also influences people’s ‘ambiguity’ towards it – ambiguity 
again understood not in normative terms.   
Our analysis also suggests that ambiguous democrats are significantly less common 
among non-Muslims. This, we would argue, is less the effect of religion or some cultural 
trait and more to do with wider political economy considerations. With the rise of Islam 
in public life, the minority-majority dynamic has become more salient in Bangladesh, 
forcing many minority groups into significantly more vulnerable situations. Minority 
groups are therefore more likely to support democracy because of its association – at 
least in principle – with tolerance and respect. This is consistent with other findings in 
South Asia in which minorities value the ‘freedom qualities’ of democracy significantly 
more than their ‘majority’ co-nationals (Shastri and Palshikar 2010).  
If we then look at the data on ambiguous theocrats, we see that they are less likely to 
have tertiary education (although this result is not statistically significant), tend to live 
in rural areas, and tend to have lower incomes.  Put in more straightforward terms, 
democratic ambiguity is primarily an urban middle class phenomenon; theocratic 
ambiguity is more a phenomenon of the rural poor, although the strength of this 
association is weaker. 
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Table 2: Probit results for 'ambiguous democrats’ and 'ambiguous theocrats’ 
 (1) (2) 
 Ambiguous Ambiguous 
 Democrats Theocrats 
Age 0.000481 -0.00111 
 (0.00241) (0.00269) 
Male 0.00711 0.164 
 (0.0655) (0.110) 
Primary completed -0.0530 0.0515 
 (0.0785) (0.0998) 
Secondary completed 0.0271 -0.0640 
 (0.0945) (0.119) 
Tertiary completed 0.237** -0.0405 
 (0.113) (0.158) 
Urban residence 0.239*** -0.191** 
 (0.0896) (0.0954) 
Family income (000s) 0.00831*** -0.00797** 
 (0.00222) (0.00388) 
Non-Muslim -0.282***  
 (0.104)  
Constant -1.034*** -1.329*** 
 (0.138) (0.156) 
Observations 2,949 2,672 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; asterisks indicate significance at level *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; equation (2) restricted to Muslim respondents only 
 
AMBIGUITY AROUND GOVERNANCE: A QUESTION OF BEING PRAGMATIC?  
 
In our introductory section, we discussed the different ways in which people might 
support democratic institutions, distinguishing between those with an intrinsic 
commitment to democracy from those with a more instrumental commitment 
(Inglehart and Welzel, 2003, Bratton and Mattes 2001). Inspired by the fact that this 
distinction has yielded insightful results in a range of national and regional contexts,  
here we want to explore further the ambiguities  we have found above and ask how far 
they can be explained by the ‘differences in support for democracy distinction’.  This we 
contend is an important question for it helps move the debate beyond the question 
about whether Bangladesh citizens support democracy to ask a deeper question, with 
stronger diagnostic power, about the quality of support for democracy.   
The survey asked respondents to identify reasons they considered essential for 
democracy. Multiple responses were allowed. We divided the different responses into 
reasons which relate to the ‘pragmatic’ benefits of democracy and those that relate to 
the ‘ethical’ imperatives for democracy, the former relating to the more instrumental or 
overt support for democracy and the latter reflecting a more intrinsic or principled 
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position. These were then coded to generate a ‘pragmatism’ and ‘ethicality’ index, and 
factor analysis was used to create a single index for each dimension. The factor loadings, 
along with the relevant statements, are reported in Table 3.  Since factor analysis 
generates measures with a mean of zero and standard deviation of 1, it is not possible to 
ask whether people are more pragmatic than ethical in their support of democracy (or 
vice versa).  We can however examine how far an individual’s commitment to 
democracy is lined to pragmatic or ethical reasons. This, as we will see below, gives 
surprising and strong results.  
Table 3: Factor loadings for indices 
Pragmatism Index Ethicality Index 
The courts are independent 
from political influence 
0.332 
Elected representatives sit in 
parliament to make laws and 
hold the government to account 
0.397 
The government is responding 
to meet the basic needs of 
people 
0.200 
Government institutions and 
officials 
(court/police/bureaucracy) 
serve the people 
0.293 
We can carry out 
business/economic activities 
without fear of extortion 
0.423 
We are free to criticize those in 
power 
0.469 
We can complete our education 
without disruption 
0.303 
Everyone is free to practice their 
own religion 
0.152 
Our basic needs are being 
fulfilled (education, health care, 
housing, clean water, 
sanitation) 
0.197 
We are free to engage in 
political activities 
0.412 
We don’t have to bribe officials 0.360 We are free to speak our mind 0.315 
Police and security services 
don’t harass people 
0.287 Everyone has equal rights 0.351 
Minorities are protected from 
attacks or harassment 
0.445 
Media can report freely without 
fear or pressure 
0.509 
Civil society groups can work 
freely without pressure or 
harassment. 
0.452  
 
 
The first question we can ask is descriptive:  do our categories of ambiguous democrats 
and ambiguous theocrats differ significantly from the rest of the population on these 
two indices?  In order to answer this, we run four t-tests to explore differences between 
each of our two groups and the rest of the population. As with the regressions reported 
above, we compare ambiguous theocrats only with other Muslims.  The results of the t-
tests are presented in Table 4.  They show that ambiguous democrats are indeed 
significantly more ‘pragmatic’ in their attitude towards democracy than others, but do 
not differ significantly from the rest of the population in terms of ‘ethicality’.  In 
contrast, ambiguous theocrats are significantly more ‘ethical’ in their attitude towards 
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democracy that other Muslims, but do not differ significantly in terms of ‘pragmatics’.  
These differences are particularly noteworthy given the reasonably high level of 
correlation between the two indices, and can be taken as confirmation that the indices 
are indeed picking up separate attitudinal dimensions.  
Table 4: Ambiguity and justifications for democracy: t-test statistics 
 
Pragmatic 
Index Ethical Index 
Ambiguous Democrats 0.049 0.013 
Others -0.011 0.001 
t-stat. 1.800** 0.360 
Ambiguous Theocrats 0.050 0.162 
Other Muslims -0.005 -0.016 
t-stat. 1.066 3.307*** 
Note: asterisks indicate significance at level *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
What have we established so far, then? We have established that while overall levels of 
support for democracy in Bangladesh are apparently high, a sizeable proportion of 
Bangladeshis hold ‘ambiguous attitudes’ toward democracy— either because they 
report thinking that democracy is the best form of government but may not be suitable 
for Bangladesh (our ‘ambiguous democrats’), or because of ambivalence towards the 
relationship between democracy and the prospect of an Islamic State (our ‘ambiguous 
theocrats’). Further, we have established that these groups differ markedly from the 
rest of the population in terms of the reasons they hold to value democracy, but in 
different ways: ambiguous democrats have a significantly more pragmatic view of 
democracy, while ambiguous theocrats have a significantly more ethical view of 
democracy. 
Given this, the next logical question to ask is whether the same set of socio-economic 
variables that predicted the different dimensions of ambiguity are also effective at 
explaining the variation in conceptualisation of democracy.  In order to do so, we can 
replicate the regression analysis in Table 2, using the two indices of Table 3 as the 
dependent variables instead of the two categories of ambiguity.  Because the indices are 
continuous rather than binary variables, we use an OLS regression instead of a probit.  
The results of this analysis are reported in Table 5. The significant predictor variables 
for the pragmatism index overlap somewhat with those for democratic ambiguity, 
although not completely. Education is therefore highly significant at all levels, with a 
larger effect at each higher stage of education, and urban residents have a significantly 
higher level of pragmatism in their conceptualisation of democracy than rural residents.  
In contrast to the democratic ambiguity measure, we do not find a significant impact of 
income on pragmatic attitudes, while we do find a strong, significant gender effect—
men have significantly more pragmatic conceptualisations of democracy then women.  
In broad terms therefore, our analysis points to the same conclusion that both 
‘pragmatic’ and ‘ambiguous’ attitudes toward democracy are largely the domain of the 
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urban, educated classes.  In contrast, there is very little similarity between the predictor 
variables for ambiguous theocrats and the predictor variables for the ethicality index: 
ambiguous theocrats were found to predominate among poorer, rural respondents, 
while the predictor variables for the ethicality index are, instead, similar to those for the 
pragmatism index, finding higher levels among men and among the more educated 
(although the impact of education is less strong, and insignificant at the primary level).  
While the coefficient on urban residence is negative, as for the ambiguous theocrats, it is 
insignificant. 
 
Table 5: OLS results for pragmatism index and ethicality index 
 (3) (4) 
 Pragmatism  Ethicality 
VARIABLES Index Index 
Age 0.00111 -6.88e-05 
 (0.00104) (0.00107) 
Male 0.0830*** 0.0917*** 
 (0.0274) (0.0280) 
Primary 
completed 
0.137*** 0.0314 
 (0.0364) (0.0372) 
Secondary 
completed 
0.283*** 0.250*** 
 (0.0443) (0.0452) 
Tertiary 
completed 
0.305*** 0.276*** 
 (0.0569) (0.0581) 
Urban residence 0.0769** -0.0339 
 (0.0308) (0.0315) 
Family income 
(000s) 
0.00132 0.000770 
 (0.00116) (0.00118) 
Non-Muslim 0.0390 0.0757 
 (0.0456) (0.0466) 
Constant -0.288*** -0.151*** 
 (0.0538) (0.0549) 
Observations 3,000 3,000 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; asterisks denote significance at levels *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
We have established, then, clear evidence of a link between ambiguous attitudes 
towards democracy and a pragmatic conceptualisation of democracy, and that these 
appear to be more common characteristics of the urban, educated middle classes.  While 
we observed a significantly higher level of ethical commitment to democracy among 
ambiguous theocrats, however, we have not been able to establish as strong a link 
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between these phenomena in socio-economic terms.  The implication of this is that we 
are missing some intervening variable(s) that mediates between conceptualisation of 
democracy and actual policy preferences. One plausible candidate here is attitudes 
towards secularism.   
In order to examine this, we construct another index using the same technique as above 
to measure respondents’ attitudes to secularism using questions that relate to religious 
institutions but not directly to democratic institutions or the nature of democracy.1  The 
correlation between this new index and our two previous indices is very low (0.019 for 
the pragmatism index; 0.013 for the ethicality index), confirming that attitudes towards 
secularism are indeed orthogonal to conceptualisations of democracy. In other words, 
both extreme secularists and extreme non-secularists can and do hold pragmatic and/or 
ethical conceptualisations of democracy. 
Armed with these three indices, we can now return to the basic question with which we 
began: is democracy always preferable to other forms of government? We run three 
probit regressions on this model (see Table 6): the first model only includes our socio-
economic basket of variables, the second model includes the pragmatism and ethicality 
indices, and the third model includes the secularism index. The socio-economic control 
variables are fairly consistent across all the models. Education is positive and 
significant, with a larger coefficient at each stage of education: higher levels of 
education correspond to higher commitment to democracy. Urban residence is 
consistently negative and significant. When we include the pragmatic and ethicality 
indices, we find them both significant but pointing in opposite directions — a finding all 
the more remarkable given the moderately high correlation between the indices. On the 
one hand, a pragmatic conceptualisation of democracy is associated with a lower 
commitment to democracy as always preferable to other forms of government. On the 
other hand, an ethical conceptualisation of democracy is associated with a higher 
commitment, although at a weaker level of significance. In the final model, however, 
when we include the secularism index, this is returned as very strongly and significantly 
correlated with a higher degree of commitment to democracy, and the ethicality index 
in this model is even weaker in significance, at the 10% threshold. 
Table 6: Probit regressions - Is democracy always preferable? 
 (5) (6) (7) 
                                                          
1 The questions used are: All major decisions should be taken by religious leaders (agree/disagree); Do you 
consider yourself a religious person (yes/no)?; Are you involved in a mosque/temple/church committee etc. 
(yes/no)?; and, Are religious parties acceptable (yes/no)?.  The scale was inverted to make more secular 
responses positive and less secular negative. 
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Age 0.00337 0.00356 0.00537** 
 (0.00236) (0.00237) (0.00258) 
Male 0.0851 0.0886 0.0391 
 (0.0607) (0.0610) (0.0663) 
Primary 
completed 
0.290*** 0.307*** 0.354*** 
 (0.0767) (0.0771) (0.0843) 
Secondary 
completed 
0.391*** 0.409*** 0.352*** 
 (0.0961) (0.0971) (0.104) 
Tertiary 
completed 
0.711*** 0.733*** 0.518*** 
 (0.138) (0.140) (0.147) 
Urban residence -0.204*** -0.191*** -0.278*** 
 (0.0675) (0.0678) (0.0737) 
Family income 
(000s) 
-0.00254 -0.00238 -0.00395 
 (0.00247) (0.00249) (0.00281) 
Non-Muslim 0.207* 0.210* -0.134 
 (0.109) (0.110) (0.130) 
Pragmatism 
Index 
 -0.145*** -0.146*** 
  (0.0486) (0.0528) 
Ethicality Index  0.0983** 0.0958* 
  (0.0482) (0.0520) 
Secularism Index   0.571*** 
   (0.0557) 
Constant 0.572*** 0.560*** 0.632*** 
 (0.132) (0.132)  (0.144) 
Observations 3,000 3,000 2,803 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
In one sense these findings are not that surprising, at least within the theoretical 
framework laid out in our first section.  They confirm that the ‘demand’ for democracy 
can indeed be premised on different conceptualisations of democracy within the 
population, and they also suggest that the nature of the democracy debate in 
Bangladesh is not so much about the ‘rights’ and ‘freedoms’ encapsulated in the ethical 
conceptualisation of democracy (see Shastri and Palshikar 2010 for a similar 
observation on Bangladesh), but more about negotiating the relationship between the 
pragmatic benefits of democracy on the one hand and the position of Islam in relation to 
the state on the other hand. Unpacking support for democracy in this way reinforces the 
need to think more seriously about policy interventions to deepen commitments to 
democracy. If there is no one size fits all model of democracy, it follows that there can be 
no one size fits all policy intervention.  
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CONCLUSION  
In this article we have established that levels of support for democracy in Bangladesh 
remain exceptionally high. This is consistent with previous findings and reports from 
over the past twenty years. The fact that support remains high despite the recent 
turbulent political history of Bangladesh, is encouraging and bodes very well for the 
future consolidation of democracy in the country.  
Like other scholars however we need to be cautious when interpreting attitudinal 
responses to politics, especially those indicating high levels of support for democracy .  
Bangladeshis may overwhelmingly support democratic values and practices but this 
does not tell us much about the more important question of whether or not that support 
has any depth. De Souza et al’s (2008) study into democracy in South Asia reported 
equally high levels of support for democracy in Bangladesh but then went on to argue 
very persuasively that the balance of democratic and non-democratic forces in 
Bangladesh was very precarious and lower than the South Asian average. In this chapter 
therefore, we have tried to advance the debate on support for democracy. We accept 
that the questions which drive our analysis are timeless, and indeed responses will 
change over time. Although our analysis and findings are exploratory, we still contend 
that they are important because they resonate with recent historical experiences of 
democracy, generate important insights and point to new avenues of future and much 
needed research.  
Our first round of findings highlighted two interesting observations. First, although 
support for democracy is high, there is a significant number of ‘committed democrats’ 
who feel that democracy may not be appropriate for Bangladesh at the moment. Second, 
there is strong support for the idea of an Islamic State although this is significantly 
tempered when respondents are asked to choose between an Islamic state and a 
democratic form of government, with support for the latter being far more dominant. 
Do these two observations shed any light on arguments around the balance of 
democratic and non-democratic forces in Bangladesh? Our response to this question 
builds on observations outlined in the paragraph above. Democracy in Bangladesh, we 
argue, has strong and tested roots and therefore talk of its demise or rejection is 
perhaps exaggerated. However we accept that the success of democracy is by no means 
a foregone conclusion and based on this affirmation, we propose an alternative 
interpretation of our observations. We would like to argue that citizen’s endorsement of 
an Islamic State (but note not of a theocracy) and their assessment that democracy may 
not be suitable for Bangladesh right now both indicate a desire not for a non-democratic 
regime but for a better democratic regime or an improved democratic model. In other 
words, both observations reflect a dissatisfaction with the democratic model as it stands 
but not necessarily with democracy per se. Furthermore, we would argue that the 
outcome of this critical reflection and questioning of specific democratic regimes which 
will give shape to the formation of future support for democracy in Bangladesh. 
20 
 
We built our analysis into the quality or depth of support for democracy around a 
distinction, found in the literature, between intrinsic and instrumental support. The 
former represents a commitment to democracy as an end in itself and is presented in 
our analysis as an ethical disposition to democracy. The latter instead sees democracy 
more as a means to an end, and is presented here as a pragmatic disposition. The crucial 
difference between the two is that the latter is conditional; and therefore in an 
important respect, can be withdrawn or increased on a temporary or permanent basis. 
The distinction is also useful because it taps into governance and political reform 
dynamics. Broadly speaking the intrinsic or ethical position reflects a normative 
commitment to democracy and therefore resonates with the language of rights, equality, 
voice and representation. The pragmatic approach to democracy instead has a strong 
institutional focus and highlights key areas of regime performance such as 
independence of the judiciary, welfare provision, levels of corruption, and so forth. 
Democracy in this context is a means to achieve positive outcomes in these different 
areas. The good governance agenda of course covers both rights and institutional 
reform but, as we argued in our introduction, in Bangladesh the emphasis to date has 
been on supporting institutional reform (ie the supply side of governance reforms). 
The broad pattern which emerges from our findings is that the pragmatic disposition to 
democracy tends to find resonance among urban, educated and middle classes. Perhaps 
not surprisingly, this perspective is associated with a commitment to democracy which 
is lower than other respondents. The ethical disposition is less clearly associated with 
particular socio-economic groups, but significantly more associated with a commitment 
to democracy. This appears to reflect religious differences and possibly, preferences 
regarding an Islamic State’. At one level, these findings can be seen as consistent with 
our observations above about the questioning of specific models of democracy. For 
some the litmus test may be about regime performance (pragmatists) while for others it 
could be a question of values or principles (the ethical disposition).  
Two further reflections however are important. First of all, our findings confirm that 
higher levels of education translate into a higher commitment to democracy and the 
effect is greater at each higher stage of education. We found this to be true in the case 
for both pragmatic and ethical dispositions. The significance of education is consistent 
with findings from across South Asia where graduates were found to be seven times 
more likely to support democracy than nonliterate people (de Souza et al 2008).  It is 
therefore reasonable to suggest that access to education, which increases with 
successive generations, will continue to have a strong impact on the way democracy 
develops in Bangladesh at least in the short and medium terms.  
Second, the high levels of association between urban middle classes and both the 
pragmatic disposition to democracy and the position of ambiguous democrat (ie 
committed democrat who prefers democracy but does not see it as suitable or 
Bangladesh), is an important finding. Bangladesh has a rapidly growing middle class 
made up of a relatively young demographic with high disposable incomes. It is also a 
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constituency about which we know very little, in particular its political aspirations and 
demands. A strong and plausible hypothesis to emerge from our analysis is that the 
urban middle classes tend to focus on the institutional benefits which democracy might 
deliver (the pragmatist disposition); and in order to secure these, certain aspects or 
qualities of the western liberal model of democracy may be sacrificed or relaxed (the 
ambiguous democrat). Put in more stark terms: if democracy is unable to deliver and 
respond to the demands and interests of the urban middle classes, support may well be 
withheld or withdrawn.  It remains a moot point what these interests may be. 
By looking at pragmatic and ethical dispositions to democracy we are able to conclude 
that the ‘demand’ for democracy can indeed be premised on different 
conceptualisations of democracy within the population. This opens up opportunities 
and risks in terms of governance interventions, as well as inevitable trade-offs. Our 
analysis suggests that institution-based approaches to governance reform are more 
likely to win the support of the educated urban middle classes. This however may come 
at the cost of a lower or at least more relaxed commitment to democracy. Furthermore 
while we accept that the need of middle class buy-in for future social change in 
Bangladesh (Devine and Wood 2009), there is a real risk that this strategy can put 
severe constraints on more radical reform in terms of wider redistributive effects. On 
the other hand, while there is some evidence that a rights based approach to democracy 
has a wide-support base and is linked to a higher commitment to democracy, equally 
important questions arise as to whether this approach can attract longer term middle 
class support and whether it opens up more space for religion to play an even more 
prominent role in politics.  
The idea of democracy has taken firm roots in Bangladesh and the analysis presented 
here indicates that Bangladesh has also infused the idea of democracy with distinctive 
and transformative meanings and experiences.  This iteration will continue in the future 
making it difficult to predict what form of democracy will evolve. It is therefore crucial 
that we pay more attention to the dynamics and relevance of support for democracy in 
Bangladesh. Pragmatic and ethical dispositions to democracy do not exist in a vacuum, 
but are both constitutive and reflective of wider constellations of values which can be 
found in the polity. Identifying and understanding the workings of these constellations 
and their interactions is, we would argue, the single most important governance 
challenge facing policy makers, practitioners and researchers alike.  
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